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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 Session of the General Assembly enacted substantial-
ly more wills, trusts, and estates legislation than one typically 
expects, some of which was of a particularly significant nature, 
such as that (1) providing for the probate of wills not executed 
with the required statutory formalities; (2) preventing any future 
application of an unfortunate augmented estate decision of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia; (3) avoiding the impact of federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 
preemption in certain insurance revocation and slayer statute 
cases; and (4) mandating notice to the public when modification 
or termination of a charitable trust, or the sale of its realty, is 
sought. In addition, there were fourteen other enactments from 
the 2007 Session, and three from the 2008 Session, along with 
eleven opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia during the 
two-year period ending May 1, 2008 that presented issues of in-
terest in this area. This article reports on all of these legislative 
and judicial developments.! 
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they 
will often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, 
those section numbers will refer to the most recent version of the section to which refer. 
ence is being made. 
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II. 2007 LEGISLATION 
A Will Execution-Statutory Formalities-Dispensation 
It is elementary law that, although a writing may have been 
executed in accordance with all of the mechanical formalities im-
posed by the statute of wills,2 nevertheless, the writing will be 
denied probate if it is the product of fraud, duress, or undue in-
fluence. And this is the way it ought to be-no one should profit 
by such conduct. In this context, the layperson unencumbered by 
a legal education would probably think it an appalling non sequi-
tur to say that, even though clear and convincing evidence (1) 
proves that a particular writing does represent the author's tes-
tamentary intent, (2) establishes the author's testamentary ca-
pacity, and (3) negates any fraud, duress, or undue influence, the 
writing will nevertheless be denied probate-solely because it 
was not executed in accordance with the statutory formalities in-
tended to ensure these goals. Yet such has been the historic gen-
eral rule in America and the historic position of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia. For example, "the statute must be strictly fol-
lowed" in order to protect the testator and prevent fraud.3 A 
growing belief that a rigid adherence to the statutory formalities 
has not only failed to accomplish this goal, 4 but, instead, has re-
2. Virginia's statute of wills (with the provisions relating to holographic wills omit-
ted) reads as follows: 
No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by 
some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to 
make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature; and moreover ... 
the signature shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence 
of at least two competent witnesses, present at the same time; and such wit-
nesses shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator .... 
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
3. Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 546, 49 S.E. 668, 669 (1905). In its most recent 
will-execution case, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that this remains the rule, i.e., 
the statute "must be strictly followed," but it then went on to render a decision that is dif-
ficult to defend under this theory. See Hampton Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. 
Stevens, 275 Va. 205, 211, 657 S.E.2d 80, 83 (2008), discussion infra Part IV.K. It is inter-
esting to note that the revocable inter vivos trust, which is increasingly being used as the 
primary vehicle for the disposition of one's estate at death, has no witnessing require-
ments or other formalities of execution, and yet there are no recorded Virginia cases where 
this has led to or facilitated the fraudulent creation of a trust. 
4. An early doubter was Lord Mansfield, who observed some 250 years ago that "[i]n 
all my experience at the Court of Delegates, I never knew a fraudulent will, but what was 
legally attested." Estate of Parsons, 163 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting 
Wyndham v. Chetwynd, (1757) 96 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B.). 
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sulted in the failure of numerous substantively valid wills,5 and 
has led some courts to relax the Procrustean rigor with which 
these requirements have been enforced in favor of a substantial 
compliance approach.6 However, because of limitations inherent 
in the substantial compliance approach, 7 this increasing dissatis-
faction with strict compliance also led to the birth of the dispen-
sation movement, which envisions a statute authorizing the trial 
court to dispense with any one or more of the statutory formali-
ties if the ultimate goal of the statute of wills is satisfied by clear 
and convincing evidence.8 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws ("NCCUSL") amended the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") 
in 1990 in order to provide for such a dispensation statute,9 and 
the statute has since been enacted by Colorado,10 Hawaii,11 Mich-
igan,12 Montana,13 South Dakota,14 and Utah;15 endorsed by the 
5. A "substantively valid will" is a testamentary writing which reflects a capacitated 
person's intent and which is not the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence. 
6. See the leading case In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1341-42 (N.J. 1991). 
There are several Virginia cases that have provided a remedy in the name of substantial 
compliance. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 42, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738-39 (1990); 
Sturdivant v. Birchett, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 67, 74, 89 (1853). However, even if these tenta-
tive steps away from the rigid adherence to statutory formalities had become the rule of 
law in Virginia, their limited applicability would represe::it an inferior solution to the 
overall problem as noted in the following text. 
7. For example, there is no way that a will with only one subscribing witness can be 
said to have substantially complied with a statute that requires two. 
8. For a more complete discussion of this subject in a Virginia context, see J. Rodney 
Johnson, Dispensing with Wills Act Formalities for Substantively Valid Wills, 18 VA. B. 
AsS'N J. 10 (1992), from which much of this paragraph is taken, and see also Kelly A. Har· 
din, Note, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and the Need for a Dispensing 
Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145 (1993). 
9. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2007). This 
section provides in its entirety as follows: 
Id. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in 
compliance with [the statute of wills], the document or writing is treated as if 
it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the 
document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the de-
cedent intended the document or writing to constitute (i) the decedent's will, 
(ii) a partial or complete revocation of the will, (iii) an addition to or an alte-
ration of the will, or (iv) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly 
revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will. 
COLO. REV. STAT.§ 15·11-503(1) (2006). 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-503 (Repl. Vol. 2006). 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.2503 (West 2002). 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2004). 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2004). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Supp. 2007). 
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Restatement of Property;16 and enacted, with modifications, by 
the 2007 Session as Virginia Code section 64.1-49.1, "Writings in-
tended as wills, etc."17 Although the Virginia dispensation statute 
adopts the language of its UPC ancestor,18 it adds the three fol-
lowing restrictions: (1) a testator's signature may be dispensed 
with in only two instances, i.e., (a) where the testator signs the 
will's self-proving affidavit instead of the will itself, and (b) 
crossed wills, where each of two testators, typically husband and 
wife, inadvertently signs the other's will; (2) the remedy is not 
available in informal probate before the clerk but only in inter 
partes proceedings before the court; and (3) a proceeding in which 
the dispensation remedy is sought must be brought within one 
year of the decedent's death.19 It is believed that this forward-
looking legislation will (1) significantly reduce the growing vo-
lume of Virginia litigation focusing on the minutiae of will execu-
tion formalities, and (2) result in an increased honoring of Virgi-
nians' testamentary intent because wills that are substantively 
valid will now be probatable notwithstanding technical defects in 
their execution.20 
B. Augmented Estate-Life Insurance-Retirement Benefits 
Virginia's archaic, inadequate, and unfair laws purporting to 
provide a surviving spouse with certain rights in a deceased 
spouse's estate21 were replaced in 1991 by an augmented estate 
regime modeled on the 1969 UPC in order to guarantee a surviv-
ing spouse a "fair share" of the value of all assets that the de-
ceased spouse owned or controlled at death.22 From the very be-
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
3.3 (1999). 
17. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-49.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
18. See id. 
19. Id. 
20. If this remedy had been available to the parties in the recent case of Hampton 
Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Stevens, 275 Va. 205, 657 S.E.2d 80 (2008), dis-
cussion infra Part IV.K., that case would have had its final resolution at the trial court 
level. 
21. These so-called "rights," i.e., dower and curtesy in real property and a forced sta-
tutory share in personal property, are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, The Abolition of 
Dower in Virginia: The Uniform Probate Code as an Alternative to Proposed Legislation, 7 
U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1972), and J. Rodney Johnson, Interspousal Property Rights at Death, 
(You Can't Take It with You, but You Can Prevent Your Spouse from Getting Any of It), 10 
VA. B. Ass'N J. 10 (1984). 
22. See J. William Gray, Jr., Virginia's Augmented Estate System: An Overview, 24 U. 
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ginning, the General Assembly expressly provided, with qualifica-
tions not relevant to this discussion, that "the terms 'estate' and 
'property' [as used in connection with the augmented estate] shall 
include insurance policies, [and] retirement benefits .... "23 How-
ever, a 2006 decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia incorrectly 
concluded that certain language in the Code, which was designed 
to protect Virginia Retirement System administered group life in-
surance and retirement benefits from the reach of a beneficiary's 
creditors, also prevented these assets from being included in an 
insured's augmented estate.24 To negate any future application or 
extension of this unfortunate decision, the 2007 Session amended 
Virginia Code Sections 64.1-16.l(D) and 64.l-16.2(F) to provide: 
All such insurance policies and other benefits are included in the 
terms "estate" and "property" [as used in connection with the aug-
mented estate] notwithstanding the presence of language contained 
in any statute otherwise providing that neither they nor their 
proceeds shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution, 
or other legal process or be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by 
any legal or equitable process or operation of law or any other such 
similar language.25 
C. ERISA Preemption-Insurance Beneficiary Revocation on 
Divorce-Slayer Statute-Codified Constructive Trust 
1. ERISA Preemption 
In order to provide a uniform federal rule for employers, ERISA 
preempts any state law that "relate[s] to" any ERISA-covered 
employee benefit plan.26 In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the decedent's employer-
provided insurance and pension plans were governed by ERISA, 
that a Washington statute providing for the automatic revocation 
RICH. L. REV. 513 (1990); J. William Gray, Jr., Administering the "Augmented" Estate, 17 
VA. B. Ass'N J. 9 (1991). 
23. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 64.1-16.l(D), -16.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
24. Sexton v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 255-57, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901--02 (2006). This opi-
nion is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and 
Estates, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 321, 338-41 (2006). 
25. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-16.l(D), -16.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2007). The rule of the Sexton 
case was applied in a recent circuit court case because the decedent therein died in 2005, 
prior to the effective date of this 2007 amendment. Higham v. Williams, CL-2006-11954, 
2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2008) (Fairfax County). 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
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upon divorce of the decedent's beneficiary designations in favor of 
his former wife related to ERISA, and therefore that the state 
statute was preempted by ERISA.27 However, although ERISA 
preempts such state statutes, it should not preempt a common 
law remedy that prevents unjust enrichment in these cases by 
imposing a constructive trust upon an unintended beneficiary af-
ter the benefits have been received.28 Moreover, NCCUSL be-
lieves that a state's codification of the common law constructive 
trust in these circumstances will not offend ERISA, and thus it 
has amended the UPC to provide such a remedy in section 2-
804(h)(2) .29 Although this UPC provision has been enacted in 
Alaska,30 Colorado,31 Hawaii,32 Michigan,33 New Mexico,34 South 
Dakota,35 and Utah,36 its validity has not yet been tested in the 
Supreme Court of the United States.37 
27. 532 U.S. 141, 146--47 (2001). 
28. See Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses 
Cash In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISA-
Governed Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373, 390 (2007). The author is in· 
debted to Ms. Rayho for sharing with him a prepublication draft of her article, which col-
lects all of the relevant authority, pro and con, and provides an excellent analysis thereof. 
This material was very helpful during the legislative process leading up to the enactment 
of the Virginia legislation described infra Part II.C.2-3. 
29. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 221 (1998). 
The Commissioners' Official Comment to UPC § 2-804(h)(2) provides in part that: 
Id. 
This provision respects ERISA's concern that federal law govern the adminis-
tration of the plan, while still preventing unjust enrichment that would result 
if an unintended beneficiary were to receive the pension benefits. Federal law 
has no interest in working a broader disruption of state probate and nonpro-
bate transfer law than is required in the interest of smooth administration of 
pension and employee benefit plans. 
30. ALASKA STAT.§ 13.12.804 (2006). 
31. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 15-11-804(8)(b) (2006). 
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-804 (Repl. Vol. 2006). 
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2809(2) (West 2002). 
34. N.M. STAT.§ 45-2-804(1) (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
35. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-804(h)(2) (2004). 
36. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75·2·804(8)(b) (Supp. 2007). 
37. It should be noted that although this legislation was prompted by the specter of 
ERISA preemption, it is not a narrow statute limited to ERISA but, instead, it is a broad 
remedy available whenever there is a preemption by any federal law. If, nevertheless, this 
codification of the common law constructive trust should be found to be a state statute 
that "relates to"-and thus is preempted by-ERISA, such a decision should not affect the 
availability of a constructive trust as a common law remedy. And, if the Supreme Court of 
the United States should determine that state common law remedies are also preempted 
by ERISA, the Court could still impose a constructive trust by an application of federal 
common law. For a discussion of federal common law in this context, see Rayho, supra 
note 28, at 384-87. For an application of federal common law in Virginia, in the context of 
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2. Revocation of Death Benefits on Divorce in Virginia 
Section 20-111.1 of the Code of Virginia, which provides for the 
revocation of death benefits in favor of a former spouse upon di-
vorce or annulment,38 would render the same result as the Wash-
ington statute in Egelhoff and thus, in cases dealing with death 
benefits arising under ERISA covered plans, this code section 
would be preempted because it "relates to" ERISA. To prevent 
this or any other federal preemption from affecting the final re-
sult in any case, the 2007 Session followed the recommendation of 
NCCUSL and amended section 20-111.1 by adding thereto the re-
levant language of UPC section 2-804(h)(2) to provide for a codi-
fied constructive trust remedy if the statute is preempted by 
any39 federal law.40 
3. Virginia Slayer Statute 
It is a fundamental rule of Virginia's public policy that a person 
should not profit as a result of the person's own wrong. In order to 
prevent one of the most reprehensible violations of this public pol-
icy, Virginia enacted a "slayer statute" to prohibit one who is con-
victed of the murder of another41 from taking an economic benefit 
the slayer statute, see Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d 
492 (W.D. Va. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut Life Insurance Co. v. Estate of Riner, 142 
Fed. Appx. 690 (4th Cir. 2005). 
38. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-111.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008). "The term 'death benefit' includes any 
payments under a life insurance contract, annuity, retirement arrangement, compensation 
agreement or other contract designating a beneficiary of any right, property or money in 
the form of a death benefit." Id. 
39. Note that the amendment is not confined to cases where the federal preemption is 
because of ERISA; such a restriction might cause a court to determine that the amend-
ment "relates to" ERISA and thus it would itself be preempted. 
40. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-111.l(D) (Repl. Vol. 2008). The Virginia provision reads in full 
as follows: 
Id. 
If this section is preempted by federal law with respect to the payment of any 
death benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives the payment of 
any death benefit that the former spouse is not entitled to under this section 
is personally liable for the amount of the payment to the person who would 
have been entitled to it were this section not preempted. 
41. The statute, as in force in 2007, was also applicable to a person found to be a mur-
derer by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding where the person "is not 
available for prosecution by reason of his death by suicide or otherwise." Id. § 55-401 
(Repl. Vol. 2007). The 2008 Session enlarged the definition of "slayer'' to include voluntary 
manslaughter. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at 
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401). This and the other 2008 amendments to the slayer statute are 
discussed in Part III.A., infra. 
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from that person by deed, will, intestacy, insurance, etc.42 In the 
present context, the rather obvious question is whether, when the 
benefits in question are flowing from an employer-provided bene-
fit plan, the slayer statute "relates to" ERISA and thus would be 
preempted. When this question was collaterally raised in Egel-
hoff, the Supreme Court of the United States noted, in dicta, that 
almost all of the states have such statutes, that these statutes 
pre-date ERISA, "[a]nd because the statutes are more or less uni-
form nationwide, their interference with the aims of ERISA is at 
least debatable."43 However, even though the validity of slayer 
statutes vis-a-vis ERISA remains an open question in the Su-
preme Court of the United States,44 the 2007 Session also 
amended Virginia's slayer statute by adding UPC-suggested lan-
guage45 to provide for a codified constructive trust remedy if any 
court should decide that the slayer statute is preempted by any 
federal law. 46 
D. Charitable Trusts-Modification, Termination, or Sale of 
Realty-Public Notice 
It is· accepted common law that, although the public, or some 
reasonably large segment thereof, is the ultimate beneficiary of a 
charitable trust, no member of the public has any right to partici-
pate in any legal proceedings seeking the modification or termi-
nation of the trust, or the sale of its real property; instead, the 
42. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to -415 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). The back-
ground of this statute is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA. 
L. REV. 521, 525-28 (1982). 
43. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001). 
44. In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Riner, the court held that even if Vir-
ginia's slayer statute was preempted by ERISA, federal common law would prevent a life 
insurance beneficiary convicted of murdering the insured from profiting by this wrong. 351 
F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (W.D. Va. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut General Life Insurance 
Co. v. Estate of Riner, 142 Fed. Appx. 690 (4th Cir. 2005). 
45. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(i)(2) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 213 (1998). 
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-414(B) (Supp. 2008). The Virginia provision reads in full 
as follows: 
Id. 
If this chapter or any part thereof is preempted by federal law with respect to 
a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this chapter, 
any person who, not for value, receives a payment, an item of property, or 
any other benefit to which he is not entitled under this chapter, shall return 
that payment, item of property, or other benefit or be liable for the amount of 
the payment or the value of the property or benefit to the person who would 
have been entitled to it were this chapter or part thereof not preempted. 
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public's interest in such matters is represented by the Attorney 
General.47 A logical extension of this rule, which provides that as 
the general public has no right to participate in such matters it 
has no right to receive any notice thereof, generated significant 
interest in an unreported circuit court case dealing with the sale 
of certain charitable real estate in the City of Richmond in 2005. 
The members of the neighborhood in which the realty was lo-
cated, who did not learn of the proposed sale until after it had 
been authorized by the court and the property was being adver-
tised, believed that they had relevant information which, had it 
been considered by the court, would have led to a different out-
come. 48 However, notwithstanding the Attorney General's wil-
lingness to argue these points on behalf of the neighborhood 
members, final judgment on the trustee's right to sell had already 
been entered in the circuit court proceeding.49 
To prevent such results in the future, the 2007 Session 
amended the notice provisions of the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") 
to require petitioners to give notice "if the proceeding seeks the 
modification or termination of a charitable trust or the sale of any 
of its real estate, to the public at large by order of publication 
published once a week for three consecutive weeks prior to any 
hearing or trial .... "50 However, as noted supra in footnote 4 7, 
this notice provision does not change the common law rule that 
members of the public at large have no right to participate in 
such proceedings. "The purpose of the notice, which shall be 
stated therein, is solely to make the public aware of the nature of 
such proceedings, the remedy being sought therein, and the op-
portunity to share their views in regard thereto with the Attorney 
General."51 It is believed that this public interest legislation is a 
salutary solution to a longstanding problem in the law of charita-
47. Notwithstanding the acceptance of this rule, it is difficult to find any case making 
a clear statement thereof. For this reason, and also to ensure that this remains the rule, 
the legislation being reported upon provides in part that "[t]his notice provision does not 
change the common law rule that members of the public at large are not entitled to be par-
ties to such judicial proceedings or to have any right to appear therein." Id. 
§ 55-542.06(A)(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
48. See Scott Bass, Windsor Farms Braces for Brouhaha, STYLE WKLY., Sept. 13, 2006, 
available at http://www.styleweekly.com/article.asp?idarticle=l2963. 
49. See id. 
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-542.06(A)(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007). The amendment further 
provides that "[t]he court shall not conduct any hearing or trial until it has made a finding 
that the required notice to the public has been given as specified herein." Id. 
51. Id. 
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ble trusts and one that is worthy of being considered in other ju-
risdictions. 
E. The Doctrine of Worthier Title-Abolished 
The common law Doctrine of Worthier Title ("DWT") held that 
if Grantor conveyed realty to X for life, with the remainder to 
Grantor's heirs, the remainder was void.52 Thus, the state of the 
title in such a case would be "life estate in X, followed by a rever-
sion in fee simple in Grantor." Upon Grantor's death, this rever-
sion would pass to Grantor's heirs53 by intestate succession be-
cause wills were not allowed at common law prior to the Statute 
of Wills in 1540. Thus, the intended persons, Grantor's heirs, 
would still take the property but, instead of taking it by deed, 
they would take it by intestacy, which was said to be the "wor-
thier title."54 Subsequent American developments resulted in 
DWT being extended to personalty and, in many jurisdictions, be-
ing changed from a rule of law to a canon of construction.55 
The U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1993 that allows the 
assets of a person who is under age 65 and disabled pursuant to 
the Sccial Security Act definition to be used to create a Special 
Needs Trust ("SNT') for the person's own benefit that will not 
count as a resource in determining the person's eligibility for Me-
dicaid.56 When trial courts create a SNT for such a disabled per-
son, frequently using assets from the person's tort claim recov-
ery,57 the courts typically require that any remainder following 
the disabled person's death (after repaying the state for all Medi-
caid expenditures) go to the person's "heirs." This practice pre-
sents a problem when DWT is a part of state law because it 
enables the Social Security Administration to maintain that DWT 
52. The operative fact is the attempted remainder to Grantor's heirs, which led to the 
rule's alternative name--the rule prohibiting remainders to the grantor's heirs. 
53. Although the rule and this paragraph speak in the plural, it should be noted that 
in most common law cases there would be a single heir-Grantor's eldest son, pursuant to 
the doctrine of primogeniture. 
54. This intestate passage would also result in the feudal equivalent of death taxes 
having to be paid, a result that would not occur if the property had passed inter vivos to 
Grantor's heirs. 
55. For the common law history of DWT, see the highly respected opinion of Judge 
Benjamin F. Cardozo in Doctor v. Hughes, 122 N.E. 221 (N.Y. 1919). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000). 
57. The same would be true when a court authorizes a disabled person's guardian to 
create a SNT with other assets of the disabled person. 
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voids the intended remainder to the disabled person's heirs, the-
reby leaving this interest in the disabled person as a reversion. 
Thus, as the disabled person now owns all of the interests in the 
trust (i.e., the life estate and the reversion) it becomes a revocable 
trust in fact, even though it is expressly stated to be irrevocable, 
and therefore not entitled to SNT treatment.58 
It is clear that DWT was a part of Virginia law when the 2007 
Session began, although it is uncertain whether it existed as a 
rule of law or as a canon of construction.59 It was also clear that 
DWT no longer served any necessary or desirable function in Vir-
ginia law. Thus, in order to prevent the above-described SNT 
problems from arising in Virginia, the 2007 Session added section 
55-14.1 to the Code to provide that "[t]he doctrine of worthier title 
is abolished in this Commonwealth as a rule oflaw and as a rule 
of construction."60 
F. Fiduciary Investments-''Mini" Legal List-$100,000 
Immunity -Uniform Transfers to Minors Act-Uniform 
Custodial Trust Act 
This topic has been the subject of several reports in these pag-
es, the most recent of which, in 2005, treated it at such length61 
that it is unnecessary to plow the same ground again. According-
ly, the 2005 report is hereby incorporated by reference, with the 
following changes due to amendments enacted by the 2007 Ses-
sion: (1) The 2005 amendment is repealed;62 (2) the immunity of 
the mini legal list is limited to $100,000, absent court action;63 (3) 
58. This paragraph's summary does not treat all matters relevant to SNTs, but it is 
believed to be sufficient for its purpose, which is to illustrate the problem presented to the 
2007 Session. For a complete and excellent discussion of this subject, see Andrew H. Hook 
& Thomas D. Begley, Jr., When Is an Irrevocable Special Needs Trust Considered To Be 
Revocable?, 31 EST. PLAN. 205 (2004). 
59. See Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 974-75, 81 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1954). 
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-14.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). This language is identical to the first 
sentence of UPC § 2-710. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-710 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 204 
(1998). The remainder of that section was thought to be unnecessary to accomplish the 
desired goal. 
61. See J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 381, 383-86 (2005). 
62. See Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 517, 2007 Va. Acts 601 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 26-40.0l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007)). This amendment provided that "[n]othing in 
this section shall relieve a fiduciary of his obligation, pursuant to § 26-45.3, to comply with 
the provisions of the prudent investor rule." Id. 
63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40.0l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
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the immunity of the mini legal list is extended to custodians un-
der the Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act and custodial 
trustees under the Virginia Uniform Custodial Trust Act64 who 
are otherwise subject to Virginia's Prudent Investor Act.65 
G. Incarcerated Felons-Civil Disabilities-Testamentary 
Capacity 
It appeared from anecdotal evidence offered to the 2007 Session 
that far too many lawyers and judges subscribe to a belief in the 
civiliter mortuus of felons while incarcerated, i.e., that they are 
treated the same as those who have been adjudicated as incapaci-
tated persons, vis-a-vis their legal inability to manage their own 
property and business affairs. However, this is true only in those 
cases where the court has appointed a committee for a felon,66 
and, again, anecdotal evidence indicates that this rarely happens. 
Thus, in almost all cases, the incarcerated felon enjoys the same 
legal rights vis-a-vis his property and business affairs as any oth-
er person.67 In an attempt to clarify this matter, and to provide 
some certainty for the commercial community, the 2007 Session 
codified the Virginia common law rule by providing that "until a 
committee is appointed, such [incarcerated felon] shall continue 
to have the same capacity, rights, powers, and authority over his 
estate, affairs, and property that he had prior to such conviction 
and sentencing."68 And, breaking new ground, the 2007 Session 
Id. 
The presumption under subsection B shall apply to (i) a fiduciary only for a 
calendar year in which the value of the intangible personal property under 
the fiduciary's control or management does not exceed $100,000 at the begin. 
ning of such year, or (ii) a fiduciary who, on motion for good cause shown, has 
obtained express authorization from the court having jurisdiction over such 
fiduciary for the presumption under subsection B to apply. 
64. See id. § 26-40.0l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
65. See id. § 26-45.13 (Cum. Supp. 2008); § 31-48(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008) (Custodial 
Trust Act);§ 55-34.7 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (Transfers to Minors Act). 
66. Id.§ 53.1-221 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
67. See Haynes v. Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 734, 100 S.E. 471, 472 (1919). Note, however, 
that for purposes of title 8.01 of the Code, the definition of "person under a disability" in-
cludes "a person convicted of a felony during the period he is confined." VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.0l-2(6)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
68. Id.§ 53.1-221(D) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
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further provided that "[a] person for whom a committee is ap-
pointed . . . is not thereby deprived of the capacity to make a 
will."69 
H. Doctrine of Exoneration-Abolished for Devises and Legacies 
Reversing the common law rule that testamentary recipients of 
property subject to an encumbrance upon which the testator is 
personally liable are entitled to have this encumbrance satisfied 
from other assets of the estate, the 2007 Session enacted Virginia 
Code section 64.1-157.1 to provide that, "[u]nless a contrary in-
tent is clearly set out in the will, 70 a specific devise or bequest of 
real or personal property passes, subject to any mortgage, pledge, 
security interest, or other lien existing at the date of death of the 
testator, without the right of exoneration."71 However, this rule 
will not apply if the encumbrance in question was placed upon 
the property by (1) an agent acting pursuant to a durable general 
power of attorney72 for an incapacitated73 testator, unless "the-
reafter ratified by the testator when he is not incapacitated,"74 or 
(2) "a conservator, guardian or committee of the testator ... [un-
less] there is an adjudication that the testator's disability has 
ceased and the testator survives that adjudication by at least one 
year."75 
One issue not addressed by this legislation relates to the in-
creasing number of cases where inter vivos trusts are being used 
as will substitutes. Suppose, for instance, X contributes property 
69. Id. 
70. On this point, the new statute also provides that "[a] general directive in the will 
to pay debts shall not be evidence of a contrary intent ... . "Id. § 64.1-157.l(A) (Repl. Vol. 
2007). 
71. Id. 
72. This exception will not apply if the power "was limited to one or more specific pur-
poses and was not general in nature." Id.§ 64.1-157.l(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
Id. 
73. This portion of the statute reads as follows: 
For the purposes of this section, (i) no adjudication of the testator's incapacity 
is necessary, (ii) the acts of an agent within the authority of a durable power 
of attorney are rebuttably presumed to be for an incapacitated testator, and 
(iii) an incapacitated person is one who is impaired by reason of mental ill-
ness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, 
chronic intoxication or other cause creating a lack of sufficient understanding 
or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.§ 64.1-157.l(C) (Rep!. Vol. 2007). 
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subject to an encumbrance upon which X is personally liable to 
X's inter vivos trust, and the trust provides for the transfer of this 
property to B at X's death. If, at X's death, any portion of this in-
debtedness remains unpaid, the duty of X's personal representa-
tive to pay X's debts will result in the exoneration of the property 
going to B. Although it would appear that the same considera-
tions leading to the new anti-exoneration rule for wills would also 
be applicable to will substitutes, the new statute does not address 
the latter.76 It would also appear that the new rule will likely 
generate a new set of practical problems in the administration of 
decedents' estates as executors deal with affected devisees and le-
gatees in cases where the encumbrance may be thought to exceed 
the value of the property, or cases where the devisee or legatee 
wishes to receive the property but does not have the funds with 
which to satisfy the indebtedness, cannot borrow the same, and 
the obligee is unwilling to enter into a novation accepting the de-
visee or legatee as the sole party liable for the debt and releasing 
the estate from liability thereon. 
I. UTC-Transfers to Trusts 
Unlike a corporation, a trust is not a legal entity capable of 
holding title to property; title to its property is vested in its trus-
tee. Unfortunately, too many lawyers are unaware of this distinc-
tion and of the corresponding rule that conveyances intended for 
the benefit of a trust's beneficiaries are to be made "to the trustee 
of the XYZ trust," instead of "to the XYZ trust," and this has led 
to too many incorrectly drafted transfer documents. To remedy 
this problem, the 2007 Session amended Virginia Code section 55-
548.10 to provide that "[a] deed or other instrument purporting to 
convey or transfer real or personal property to a trust instead of 
to the trustee or trustees of the trust shall be deemed to convey or 
transfer such property to the trustee or trustees as fully as if 
made directly to the trustee or trustees."77 
76. The same consideration will apply to other instances of encumbered properties 
passing outside of probate, where the decedent is personally liable thereon, such as survi-
vorship tenancies, transfer on death property, payable on death property, etc., although in 
the survivorship tenancies, the survivor's right of exoneration from the decedent's probate 
estate will be limited to the decedent's proportionate share of the obligation. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957). 
77. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-548.lO(E) (Rep!. Vol. 2007). 
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J. Insolvent Estates-Priority of Debts 
Virginia Code section 64.1-15 7 establishes the priorities in 
which claims against an insolvent decedent's estate are to be 
paid. The 2007 Session promoted "[d]ebts and taxes due localities 
and municipal corporations of the Commonwealth" from the last 
category of "[a]ll other claims" into a new category of its own, 
immediately preceding the "[a]ll other claims" category.78 
K. Incapacitated Persons-Conservator's Sale of Realty-
Restrictions 
Virginia Code section 37.2-1023(B) authorizes circuit court 
judges to impose certain enumerated requirements upon conser-
vators seeking to convey an incapacitated person's realty.79 The 
2007 Session amended this provision by adding another permiss-
ible condition thereto, "requiring the use of a common source in-
formation company, as defined in§ 54.1-2130,80 when listing the 
property."81 
L. Retirement Benefits-Exemption from Creditor Claims-
Bankruptcy Conformity 
The 2007 Session amended Virginia Code section 34-34 so that 
it matches the state exemption of retirement benefits to the ex-
emption permitted under new federal bankruptcy law.82 
M. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act -Use of Property-
Termination 
The 2007 Session amended Virginia Code section 31-50, which 
deals with the custodian's use of custodial property, by adding 
language providing that "[a]t any time a custodian may, without 
78. Id.§ 64.1-157(8)-(9) (Supp. 2008). 
79. See id.§ 37.2-1023(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
80. "'Common source information company' means any person, firm, or corporation 
that is a source, compiler, or supplier of information regarding real estate for sale or lease 
and other data and includes, but is not limited to, multiple listing services." Id. § 54.1-
2130 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
81. Id.§ 37.2-1023(B)(v) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
82. See Act of Mar. 12, 2007, ch. 302, 2007 Va. Acts 428 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-34 (Cum. Supp. 2008)). 
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court order, transfer all or part of the custodial property to a 
qualified minor's trust.83 Such a transfer terminates the custo-
dianship to the extent of the custodial property transferred."84 
N. Power of Attorney-Removal of Agent for Cause-Attorney 
Fees 
Along with the increasing use of durable powers of attorney for 
the management of a functionally incapacitated (but not adjudi-
cated) person's property has come an increase in the instances of 
agents abusing their powers thereunder and, not surprisingly, an 
increase in the number of circuit court cases seeking the removal 
of such agents. One of the factors preventing more cases from be-
ing brought is the inability or unwillingness of family members to 
advance the necessary attorney fees which, under the American 
legal system, are not recoverable from the agent even if the fami-
ly prevails. To help remedy this problem, the 2007 Session 
amended Virginia Code section 11-9.1 to provide that "[i]f an 
agent is removed by the court because of abuse, neglect or exploi-
tation of the principal, all fees and costs associated with the re-
moval proceeding, including the attorney's fees of the prevailing 
party, shall be borne by the agent."85 
0. UTC-Beneficiary's Right to Information-Trustee's Duty 
Many settlors of inter vivos trusts have a desire to keep the 
terms and provisions thereof as private as possible, and this de-
sire often extends to withholding significant trust-related infor-
mation from the beneficiaries themselves.86 Virginia's enactment 
of the UTC advanced the interests of the beneficiaries in this re-
gard by providing that "[u]nless unreasonable under the circums-
tances, a trustee shall promptly respond to a beneficiary's request 
83. "'Qualified minor's trust' means any trust (including a trust created by a custo-
dian) that meets the requirements of § 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and 
the regulations implementing that section." VA. CODE ANN. § 31-37 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
84. Id. § 31-50 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
85. Id. § 11-9.l(D) (Cum. Supp. 2008). For reasons that are unknown, this same legis-
lation also codified one of the most basic rules of the common law, viz: "The agent stands 
in a fiduciary relationship to the principal by whom he was appointed and may be held 
liable for a breach of any fiduciary duty to the principal." Id. § 11-9.l(C) (Supp. 2007). 
86. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 253 Va. 30, 35, 480 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1997), discussed in J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1249, 1277-78 (1997). 
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for information related to the administration of the trust."87 The 
pendulum swung back to the settlors' side in 2007 as the General 
Assembly effectively gelded this rule by providing that 
[a] trustee who fails to furnish information to a beneficiary or re-
spond to a request for information regarding the administration of 
the trust in a good faith belief that to do so would be unreasonable 
under the circumstances or contrary to the purposes of the settlor 
shall not be subject to removal or other sanctions therefor.88 
Thus, if a settlor clearly states that privacy/secrecy is a trust 
purpose, even insofar as beneficiaries are concerned, then the 
trustee who refuses a beneficiary's request for information "in a 
good faith belief that to do so would be ... contrary to the purpos-
es of the settlor shall not be subject to removal or other sanctions 
therefor."89 If this language receives a literal interpretation in the 
courts, it will be game, set, and match for settlor. 
P. UTC-Mandatory Rules 
One of the mandatory rules of the UTC that cannot be over-
ridden by the terms of a trust, the trustee's duty to act in accor-
dance with the purposes of the trust, was expanded by the 2007 
Session to a duty to act in accordance with "the terms and pur-
poses of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries."90 
Q. UTC-Creditors' Rights-Mandatory Distribution 
Even in the case of a spendthrift trust, a beneficiary's creditors 
can reach a mandatory distribution due but unpaid to the benefi-
ciary while it is still in the trustee's possession if the distribution 
is not made "within a reasonable time after the designated distri-
bution date."91 For the purposes of this rule, the 2007 Session 
added a definition of "mandatory distribution"92 that, with one 
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-548.13(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007). This subsection also provides that 
"[a] trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about 
the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect 
their interests." Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. This provision also reverses the rule of the common law. See Fletcher, 253 Va. 
at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491, discussed in Johnson, supra note 86, at 1277-78. 
90. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-541.05(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
91. Id.§ 55-545.06(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
92. Id. § 55-545.06(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2007). 
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possible exception, is reasonably obvious and should admit of 
straight-forward application. The potentially troublesome lan-
guage states that "[t]he term does not include a distribution sub-
ject to the exercise of the trustee's discretion even if ... (ii) the 
terms of the trust authorizing a distribution use language of dis-
cretion with language of direction."93 Taking into account the 
many word choices available to drafting attorneys and the imagi-
nation of litigators, this exception for distributions that "use lan-
guage of discretion with language of direction" may prove to be 
troublesome in some cases. 
R. Durable Power of Attorney-Non-Judicial Accounting-
Judicial Discovery 
The 1995 Session responded to the problem of an agent for a 
functionally incapacitated (but not adjudicated) principal who re-
fuses to provide members of the principal's family with any in-
formation regarding the principal's affairs by creating (1) a non-
judicial accounting remedy in favor of a person "interested in the 
welfare of a principal"94 who is "unable to properly attend to his 
affairs,"95 and (2) a judicial discovery remedy in favor of these 
same persons when the desired information is not forthcoming or 
where further action against the agent might be in order.96 The 
2007 Session expanded the operation of these remedies by (1) 
changing the reference from a principal who "is unable to proper-
ly attend to his affairs," to one who is "believed to be unable to at-
tend to his affairs," (2) allowing the remedies to be pursued after 
the principal's death, (3) extending the duration of the accounting 
period from two to five years, (4) providing for access to the judi-
cial discovery remedy if the agent fails to respond to a request for 
a non-judicial accounting within sixty days, and (5) expanding the 
scope of judicial discovery to cases where property recovery or 
personal liability might be the ultimate goal.97 
93. Id. 
94. This term is defined in VA. CODE ANN.§ 37.2-1018(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
95. This term is defined in VA. CODE ANN.§ 37.2-1018(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
96. This development is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia 
Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176-79 (1995). 
97. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 11-9.6, 37.2-1018(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008) (emphasis add-
ed). 
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Ill. 2008 LEGISLATION 
A. Slayer Statutes-Revision-Clarification-Voluntary 
Manslaughter Problem 
453 
It is a fundamental rule of Virginia's public policy that a crimi-
nal should not profit as a result of his crime. In order to prevent 
one of the most reprehensible violations of this public policy, i.e., 
a murderer taking an economic benefit from his victim by deed, 
will, intestacy, insurance, etc., Virginia has a "slayer statute" 
which traces its antecedents back to 1919,98 and which evolved 
over the years into a comprehensive set of rules enacted by the 
1981 Session entitled "Acts Barring Property Rights."99 The 2008 
Session amended a number of these rules based upon a study and 
recommendations by the Virginia Bar Association (''VBA"), and it 
also made an amendment, opposed by the VBA, to another 
rule.100 This report will deal with the enacted VBA recommenda-
tions (House Bill No. 949) in Section 1, the other enacted recom-
mendation (Senate Bill No. 450) in Section 2, and then present 
their combined definition of the term "slayer" in Section 3. 
1. House Bill No. 949 
The space constraints of this survey article preclude a complete 
discussion of these enactments, but they may be summarized as 
follows: (1) the definition of "slayer" in Virginia Code section 55-
401 was expanded to include one "who is determined, whether be-
98. The history of the slayer statute can be found in Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v. 
Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (E.D. Va. 1962). 
99. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to -415 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). This legisla-
tion was based upon a proposed Model Act drafted by John W. Wade, Acquisition of Prop-
erty by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936). For a 
discussion of Virginia law prior to this legislation, and the language recommended for 
enactment, see Sandra Gross Schneider, Comment, Barring Slayers' Acquisition of Proper-
ty Rights in Virginia: A Proposed Statute, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 251 (1979). For a discussion 
of the Virginia legislation as amended and enacted, see J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, 
and Estates, 68 VA. L. REV. 521, 525-28 (1982). 
100. The VBA recommendations were contained in House Bill No. 949; the recommen-
dation opposed by the VBA was contained in Senate Bill No. 450. These two bills were con-
formed during the legislative process (i.e., each one was amended to contain the contents 
of both), contrary to the wishes of the VBA, and both bills were enacted. H.B. 949, Va. 
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts 
_j; S.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 
830, 2008 Va. Acts _J. 
454 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:435 
fore or after his death, by a court of appropriate jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have committed" the offense in 
question;lOl (2) the language preventing any "person claiming 
through" a slayer from taking was amended in two code sections 
to clarify that (a) it referred to one deriving title through the 
slayer as a "transferee, assignee or other" person claiming 
through him,102 and (b) it did not refer to "[a]n heir or distributee 
who establishes his kinship to the decedent by way of his kinship 
to a slayer .... ";103 (3) the rule preventing the anti-lapse statute 
from applying to a testamentary provision for a slayer was re-
versed;104 (4) the misleading titles of the two sections dealing 
with concurrent ownership were clarified;105 (5) the language ex-
101. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 2008)). This opportunity to apply the slayer statute in a civil pro-
ceeding in cases where a conviction is not obtained in a criminal prosecution is sometimes 
referred to as an "O.J." remedy because of its application under California law to a famous 
football player with that nickname. 
102. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-402 (Supp. 2008)). In consequence of this change, the "through" language in the 
insurance section (§ 55-411) had no further operation except as a "corruption of the blood" 
provision that penalizes an innocent party for the wrongs of another. Thus, it was deleted 
as contrary to Virginia's public policy. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
4ll(A) (Supp. 2008)). 
103. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-403 (Supp. 2008)). 
104. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-404 (Supp. 2008)). When this provision was enacted in 1980, Virginia had one of 
the broadest anti-lapse statutes in the country; it was applicable to any beneficiary prede-
ceasing the testator leaving children or descendants of deceased children. See Act of Mar. 
31, 1980, ch. 454, 1980 Acts 522 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-64 (Rep!. 
Vol. 1980) (repealed 1985)). As the anti-lapse statute is now restricted to cases where the 
substituted beneficiaries are also close kindred of the testator, see VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
64.1 (Rep!. Vol. 2007), it was determined that the former provision was inconsistent with 
the intestate succession rule found in section 55-403 and also amounted to a "corruption of 
the blood" contrary to Virginia's public policy. 
105. See Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 55-405 to -406 (Supp. 2008)). Until 1992, a "slayer" of a cotenant in a tenan-
cy involving survivorship rights was prohibited from acquiring the cotenant's half-interest 
by survivorship; instead, the death of the cotenant caused a severance of the tenancy and 
the slain tenant's half-interest passed with his other property by will or intestate succes-
sion (but not to the slayer). The 1992 amendment to section 55-406 continued this rule as 
to cotenancies not involving survivorship. But, with regard to every form of survivorship 
tenancy, the 1992 amendment to section 55-405 provided for the passing of the slayer's 
interest to the estate of the decedent as if the slayer had predeceased the decedent. How-
ever, the failure to make corresponding changes in the titles of these two sections has 
created a certain confusion that the 2008 amendments now eliminate by retitling sec-
tion 55-405 as "Concurrent ownership with survivorship," and section 55-406 as "Concur-
rent ownership without survivorship." For a discussion of the 1992 legislation, see J. Rod-
ney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 873, 895-96 (1992). The 2008 amendments also rewrote the final clause of section 55-
406 which, since the 1992 amendments, had erroneously referred to survivorship concerns 
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empting life insurance companies from liability on policies "pro-
cured and maintained by the slayer or on which all the premiums 
were paid by him," was replaced with language focusing on poli-
cies procured within two years of the insured's death as part of a 
plan to murder the insured;106 and (6) the chapter's construction 
section was amended to expressly state that its provisions are not 
exclusive,107 and that "all common law rights and remedies that 
prevent one who has participated in the willful and unlawful kill-
ing of another from profiting by his wrong shall continue to exist 
in the Commonwealth."108 
2. Senate Bill No. 450 
The 2008 Session adopted a further amendment to Virginia 
Code section 55-401 which expanded the definition of "slayer" to 
include a person convicted of voluntary manslaughter or who, 
though not so convicted, is found guilty thereof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in a civil proceeding brought before or after 
his death.109 This legislative proposal was introduced in response 
to a 2007 federal district court case, Boston Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. u. Ludwig, in which the court stated the issue to be 
"whether a person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, but not 
murder, is precluded as a beneficiary of the decedent's life insur-
ance proceeds by the slayer statute in Pennsylvania or Virgin-
ia."110 Although Pennsylvania law was found to be controlling, 
the court noted in dicta that 
even if Virginia law applied, the result would be the same since Vir-
ginia's common law rule that no person shall be allowed to profit by 
his own wrong has not been abrogated by any act of the General As-
sembly, thereby precluding a person convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter from receiving life insurance proceeds.111 
in this non-survivorship section. 
106. The legislation as introduced provided for the complete repeal of this provision. 
The enacted language is the result of conferences between the VBA, certain insurance in-
dustry representatives, and the bill's patron. 
107. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-414(A) (Supp. 2008)). This provision is a codification of Peoples Security Life In-
surance Co. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 92, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992). 
108. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-414(A) (Supp. 2008)). 
109. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 2008)). 
l10. No. 1:06CV1072(JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34812, at *l (E.D. Va. May 10, 
2007). 
111. Id. at *17. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that the Virginia slayer statute con-
tained no provision expressly requiring such a result prompted 
the introduction of Senate Bill No. 450 to add a person convicted 
of voluntary manslaughter to the statute's definition of "slay-
er."112 
However, it is submitted that this lack of an express provision 
in the slayer statute presented no real problem in light of other 
applicable case law113 and the intended solution to the perceived 
problem has, itself, created a significant problem in the jurispru-
dence of the Commonwealth. It is a regrettable fact that there are 
some premeditated homicide cases where, although a murder 
conviction is sought (and deserved), the Commonwealth accepts a 
plea to voluntary manslaughter because of an evidentiary prob-
lem, or a divided jury returns a compromise verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter, etc. On the other hand, there are a number of non-
premeditated homicide cases that will also result in a voluntary 
manslaughter conviction, such as: (1) the classic case of the 
abused spouse who finally snaps and strikes back with excessive 
force; (2) the spouse who catches the other in an act of adultery 
112. S.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 
830, 2008 Va. Acts __j. As introduced, the bill also sought to include involuntary man-
slaughter in the definition of "slayer." S.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008). 
113. In addition to the dicta in Boston, there is a 1962 federal district court case arising 
in the Eastern District of Virginia, with facts parallel to those in Boston, where the court, 
recognizing that there were no Virginia cases on point, refused to allow the spouse con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter to take, noting that, 
There can be no doubt that the general rule, followed probably universally, is 
that a beneficiary of an insurance policy who kills the insured by murder or 
voluntary manslaughter cannot take the proceeds of the policy. This is be-
cause of the ancient common law doctrine that no man shall be allowed to 
profit by his own wrong. 
Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 411 (E.D. Va. 1962). The court in Boston 
appears to have reached its conclusions without an awareness of this case, as it is not refe-
renced therein. 
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia held in 1992 that the General 
Assembly did not abrogate the common law when it enacted the slayer statute. Peoples 
Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 92, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992). And, it might be 
further noted that one of the VBA's enacted recommendations was a codification of the 
Peoples holding along with additional consequential language flowing from this codifica-
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08. 
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and kills in the heat of passion; (3) cases involving mutual com-
bat, e.g., two family members fighting and one dies; and (4) cases 
of imperfect self-defense.114 
It is clear that the actors in all of these non-premeditated man-
slaughter cases are "wrong" in what they do, and they are subject 
to appropriate punishment in the criminal law courts that takes 
into account all of the circumstances of their cases. But, adding 
"voluntary manslaughter" to the definition of "slayer" in section 
55-401 also imposes a mandatory forfeiture of any inheritance or 
other assets "from" the decedent in all of these cases-regardless 
of the circumstances-with the court being powerless to prevent 
or reduce it. However, the common law remedy of constructive 
trust (which would be the remedy in the absence of the amend-
ment in question) would provide a flexible rule in these cases-
with the court determining whether or not, under the unique cir-
cumstances of a particular case, a forfeiture would be appropriate 
and, if so, to what extent. 
In the preceding paragraph, reference was made to a mandato-
ry forfeiture of any inheritance or other assets "from" a decedent. 
The word "from" was placed in quotation marks because the 
magnitude of the forfeiture in a number of cases will be far great-
er than the word "from" might otherwise suggest. For example, in 
the case of the abused spouse, it is not unrealistic to assume that 
in some cases the title to "their" property might be in the de-
ceased abuser's sole name-and yet the statute mandates a forfei-
ture of the entire property in every case, with the court being un-
able to make any exceptions.115 Moreover, even if the couples in 
the abuse and the adultery cases mentioned above hold their 
property as tenants by the entirety, or joint tenants with the 
right of survivorship, the surviving spouse will forfeit both halves 
of the property under the slayer statute (not just the decedent's 
half) because section 55-405 mandates that survivorship property 
114. In addition to the number of persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter in such 
criminal prosecutions, the number of persons affected by this amendment will be in-
creased by (1) those whom the Commonwealth decided should not be prosecuted; (2) those 
whom a grand jury failed to indict; and (3) those who were tried but acquitted, but who, in 
any of these three instances, are later found in a civil proceeding to have committed the 
offense. 
115. This would be the statutory mandate even if the abused spouse had been primari-
ly responsible for the property's acquisition by making the house payments, car payments, 
etc. 
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pass "as though the slayer had predeceased the decedent."116 
Thus, the fact of the statute's mandatory forfeiture in voluntary 
manslaughter cases where a chancellor would not impose a con-
structive trust is made even worse by the magnitude of the forfei-
ture that will occur in some of them. It is to be hoped that this 
state of the law will not be suffered to exist any longer than is ne-
cessary for its correction. 
3. The Enacted Legislation 
As a result of the 2008 Session's action in conforming House 
Bill No. 949 and Senate Bill No. 450, and passing both of them, 
the slayer statute's enacted definition of "slayer" now reads as fol-
lows: 
"Slayer" shall mean any person (i) who is convicted of the murder or 
voluntary manslaughter of the decedent or, (ii) in the absence of such 
conviction, who is determined, whether before or after his death, by a 
court of appropriate jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 
to have committed one of the offenses listed in subdivision (i) result-
ing in the death of the decedent.117 
In all other respects, the enacted legislation is as noted in Sec-
tion 1 of this Paragraph A.118 
B. Wills-Self-Proving Affidavit-Notarial Seal 
Prior to 1977, the statutory form for an affidavit that would 
make a will self-proving provided for the officer before whom the 
affidavit was executed to affix the officer's official seal thereto. 
The 1977 Session removed the "seal" requirement from the statu-
tory form119 and the Code presently provides that the affidavit 
will be effective "notwithstanding that (i) the officer did not at-
tach or affix his official seal thereto .... "120 Although Virginia's 
Notary Act provides that a notary "shall" affix an official seal on 
every notarial certificate, it has also provided that "failure to affix 
an official seal shall not in any way impact the legality or efficacy 
116. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-405 (Supp. 2008). 
117. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 2008)). 
118. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. 
119. Act of Mar. 22, 1977, ch. 333, 1977 Va. Acts 471 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). 
120. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
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of the paper document."121 However, this latter provision was re-
pealed by the 2008 Session,122 which also added a section to the 
conveyancing chapter, providing in part that "[a] writing that is 
not properly notarized ... shall not invalidate the underlying 
document."123 Summing up these developments, it is clear that 
the absence of a seal on a self-proving affidavit will have no nega-
tive impact upon the will itself; at most it will simply require that 
the will be probated in the traditional manner, which typically 
will be upon the testimony of one of the attesting witnesses. 
Whether the 2008 repeal of the general provision in section 
47.1-16(C) of the Notary Act, that "failure to affix an official seal 
shall not in any way impact the legality or efficacy of the paper 
document,"124 also impliedly repeals the specific provision con-
tained in section 64.1-87.1 that a self-proving affidavit will beef-
fective "notwithstanding that (i) the officer did not attach or affix 
his official seal thereto,"125 seems doubtful. Nevertheless, until 
this issue is resolved the prudent attorney will ensure that every 
self-proving affidavit is under seal in order to meet the require-
ments of the Notary Act.126 
It should also be noted that the 1983 Session provided for an 
alternate form of self-proving affidavit, usually referred to as the 
"short form" affidavit, which differs from the long-form affidavit 
by not requiring the signatures of the testator and witnesses the-
reto.127 The short-form affidavit has never had any provision for a 
"seal," nor has it contained any language like that found in the 
long-form section providing that a seal is not necessary. Accor-
dingly, it seems clear that the short-form affidavit will be gov-
121. Id.§ 47.l-16(A)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
122. Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 117, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 47.l-16(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008)). However, the legislation making this change also 
contained a savings clause providing "[t]hat any document notarized prior to July 1, 2008, 
shall not be affected or invalidated by amendments to this Act effective July 1, 2008." H.B. 
218, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 117, 2008 
Va. Acts __J. 
123. Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 117, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-106.2 (Cum. Supp. 2008)). 
124. VA. CODE ANN.§ 47.1-16(C) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
125. Id.§ 64.1-87.1 (Rep!. Vol. 2007). 
126. It is believed that most attorneys are already following this practice in order to 
give their documents as much effect as possible beyond Virginia's boundaries because the 
"seal" is required on self-proving affidavits in many states. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
504(a), 8 U.L.A. 148 (1998). 
127. Act of Mar. 14, 1983, ch. 83, 1983 Va. Acts 94 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 64.1-87.2 (Rep!. Vol. 2007)). 
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erned by the provisions of the Notary Act, discussed above, and 
thus it will not be effective without the required seal.128 
C. Insolvent Estates-Priority of Debts 
Virginia Code section 64.1-157 establishes the priorities in 
which claims against an insolvent decedent's estate are to be 
paid. The 2008 Session increased the priority amount for funeral 
expenses from $2000 to $3500.129 
IV. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
A. Principal and Agent-Joint Accounts-Presumption of Fraud 
The primary issue in Grubb u. Grubb involved Brother, who 
was agent under Sister's durable general power of attorney, 
claiming ownership of certain joint bank accounts upon Sister's 
death.130 In disputed testimony, Brother claimed that Sister had 
added his name to these accounts before he became her agent and 
that "he merely renewed the accounts in order to maintain the 
'status quo."'131 The Supreme Court of Virginia noted prior au-
thority for the proposition that "any transaction involving her as-
sets that he consummated to his own benefit while acting as her 
fiduciary is presumptively fraudulent,"132 and added that the 
presumption arose in this case when Brother "either opened or 
renewed those accounts using his power of attorney."133 After re-
viewing the conflicting evidence in this case, the court affirmed 
the chancellor's decision that Brother had not rebutted the pre-
sumption.134 
128. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the short-form does not enjoy a wide following 
among Virginia lawyers, because it is not believed to have as much currency outside the 
commonwealth as the Jong-form. 
129. Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 817, 2008 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-157(3) (Supp. 2008)). 
130. 272 Va. 45, 49-50, 630 S.E.2d 746, 749 (2006). 
131. Id. at 53, 630 S.E.2d at 751. 
132. Id. (citing Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 259 Va. 806, 812, 528 S.E.2d 714, 718 
(2000); Nicholson v. Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 277-78, 64 S.E.2d 813, 817-18 (1951)). 
133. Grubb, 272 Va. at 54, 630 S.E.2d at 752. 
134. Id. at 58, 630 S.E.2d at 754. 
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B. Wrongful Death Action-Administrator May Not Proceed Pro 
Se 
In Kone v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of Virginia "consider[ed] 
whether the administrator of a decedent's estate may file a 
wrongful death action pro se."135 Answering this question in the 
negative, the court noted that, although this statutory "right of 
action" is vested in a personal representative by Virginia Code 
section 8.0l-50(B), "[t]he cause of action, however, does not belong 
to the personal representative but to the decedent's beneficiaries 
identified in Code§ 8.01-53."136 
C. Wills-Personal Property-Personal Injury Cause of Action-
D. C. Law 
In Huaman v. Aquino, Sister bequeathed unto three of her six 
brothers "all the personal property I own or over which I have 
disposing power at the time of my death, including funds in any 
and all financial accounts."137 At the time of Sister's death she 
had a personal injury action pending in Washington, D.C., which 
was settled after her death-which occurred as a result of these 
injuries-with payment to her estate of $1, 778,578.138 Sister's ex-
ecutor maintained that these funds did not pass under the above 
bequest because Sister "neither owned nor had power to dispose 
of such property, namely the proceeds, at the time of her 
death."139 Although such a personal injury action would not sur-
vive Sister's death under Virginia law, where a new cause of ac-
tion for wrongful death would arise in favor of certain statutory 
beneficiaries instead of Sister's estate, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia found the contrary to be true under District of Columbia 
law.140 Thus, "[t]his particular chose in action was 'owned' at the 
moment of [Sister's] death ... and pass[ed] under the personal 
property clause."141 
135. 272 Va. 59, 61, 630 S.E.2d 744, 745 (2006). 
136. Id. at 62-63, 630 S.E.2d at 746. 
137. 272 Va. 170, 174, 630 S.E.2d 293, 296 (2006). 
138. Id. at 172, 630 S.E.2d at 295. 
139. Id. at 175, 630 S.E.2d at 296. 
140. Id. at 175-76, 630 S.E.2d at 297. 
141. Id. at 176, 680 S.E.2d at 297. 
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D. Augmented Estate-Election-No Acknowledgment-Strict 
Construction 
In order for a surviving spouse to claim an elective share in a 
deceased spouse's augmented estate, Virginia Code section 64.1-
13 requires that the claim "shall be made either in person before 
the court ... or by writing recorded in such court, or the clerk's 
office thereof, upon such acknowledgment or proof as would au-
thorize a writing to be admitted to record under Chapter 6 (§ 
55-106 et seq.) of Title 55."142 In Haley v. Haley, Wife's attorney 
purported to make an election on her behalf by filing a document 
in the appropriate clerk's office that was signed on her behalf by 
the attorney but not acknowledged.143 Affirming the decision be-
low, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that one seeking to elect 
under section 64.1-13 "must strictly comply with [its] require-
ments" and thus, as the document in question was not acknowl-
edged, it was ineffective as a matter of law.144 For this same rea-
son, the court did not reach one part of an issue that has long 
been debated among Virginia lawyers-whether an augmented 
estate election can be made on a surviving spouse's behalf by the 
spouse's attorney.145 
E. Deeds-Rescission-Undue Influence-Family Relationship 
The facts in Bailey v. Turnbow showed that, following her hus-
band's death in 1989, Annerbell's closest kindred were twelve 
nieces and nephews, one of whom, Mary, "handled her financial 
affairs from 1993 until [Annerbell's] death" in 1997, and another 
of whom, Gilbert, with whom she "also had a close relationship" 
and who, along with Mary, "resided near her and helped her in 
various ways during her widowhood."146 Within the last two 
months of her life, Annerbell, who had just recently signed herself 
out of the nursing home she had voluntarily entered two months 
earlier, and who was generally in a physically weakened condi-
tion, conveyed her home to Gilbert by deed of gift with the reser-
142. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
143. 272 Va. 703, 705, 636 S.E.2d 400, 401 (2006). 
144. Id. at 707, 636 S.E.2d at 402. 
145. Id. at 708 n.*, 636 S.E.2d at 403 n.* ("[W]e ... express no opinion in that regard." 
The other half of the issue is whether an augmented estate election can be made on a sur-
viving spouse's behalf by the spouse's attorney in fact. 
146. 273 Va. 262, 264, 639 S.E.2d 291, 291-92 (2007). 
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vation of a life estate.147 The deed of gift was prepared by Gil-
bert's attorney, at Gilbert's request, and executed by Annerbell in 
Gilbert's home before a notary public who worked there as an 
employee of Gilbert and his wife.148 
Annerbell's executor brought suit against Gilbert seeking res-
cission of the deed of gift based upon a number of grounds, only 
one of which, undue influence, was not dismissed following a five-
day trial.149 On this point, the chancellor ruled that the evidence 
had established a confidential relationship between Annerbell 
and Gilbert, "giving rise to a presumption of undue influence, 
which [Gilbert] had failed to rebut, in the procurement of the 
challenged deed."150 Noting the absence of either a princip-
al/agent or an attorney/client relationship between Annerbell and 
Gilbert, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the only 
remaining possibility of raising a presumption of undue influence 
was "'when one family member provides financial advice or han-
dles the finances of another family member."'151 However, the 
evidence showed that Mary was the one who provided this advice 
and rendered these services and thus the court held that, 
"[t]ested by that standard, the evidence in the present case is in-
sufficient to support the chancellor's finding."152 
F. Decedent's Personal Injury Action-Not Wrongful Death-
Statute of Limitations 
In Harmon v. Sadjadi, "a personal injury action for damages 
allegedly sustained by James [in Virginia] prior to his death from 
other causes," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, notwith-
standing Harmon's earlier qualification as James' personal repre-
sentative in another state, the one-year statute of limitations for 
Harmon to bring this action in Virginia did not begin until he 
qualified in Virginia.153 This decision overruled the court's prior 
holding in McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 154 which was 
147. Id. at 265--66, 639 S.E.2d at 292. 
148. Id. at 266, 639 S.E.2d at 292. 
149. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 293. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 268 & n.*, 639 S.E.2d at 294 & n.* (2007) (quoting Friendly Ice Cream Corp. 
v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 34, 597 S.E.2d 34, 40 (2004)). 
152. Bailey, 273 Va. at 268, 639 S.E.2d at 294. 
153. 273 Va. 184, 188 n.2,198, 639 S.E.2d 294, 296 n.2, 302 (2007). 
154. 198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956). 
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"clearly a mistake and a flagrant error that we will not perpe-
tuate."155 
G. Illegitimacy-Action To Ascertain Parental Relationship-No 
Tolling 
One of the steps required by statute before an illegitimate per-
son's claim to intestate succession based upon biological paren-
tage can be recognized is that "an action seeking adjudication of 
parenthood is filed in an appropriate circuit court within [one 
year of the alleged parent's death]."156 In Belton v. Crudup, the 
decedent died on September 13, 1999; his administrator filed a 
list of heirs with the court on December 21, 1999 naming the 
claimant, the decedent's alleged illegitimate daughter, as an heir; 
and his administrator filed an amended list of heirs on July 17, 
2001 on which the claimant's name no longer appeared.157 The 
claimant, whose action seeking adjudication of parenthood was 
not filed until January 16, 2002, maintained that the one-year 
statute of limitations should be tolled "during the time her name 
appeared on the original list of heirs filed by the Administra-
trix."158 In affirming the trial court's denial, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia noted that the General Assembly had provided only 
three exceptions to the one-year rule,159 none of which were ap-
plicable in this case, and "we decline to carve out others."160 
H. Illegitimacy-Exhumation To Prove Biological Relationship-
No Defenses 
In Martin v. Howard, Decedent was survived by Wife, by their 
two children, and by Tracey, who maintained that she was his il-
155. Harmon, 273 Va. at 197, 639 S.E.2d at 301. 
156. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
157. 273 Va. 368, 370, 641 S.E.2d 74, 75 (2007). 
158. Id. at 370, 372, 641 S.E.2d at 75, 76 (2007). 
159. These exceptions apply when the relationship is 
(i) established by a birth record prepared upon information given by or at the 
request of such parent; or (ii) by admission by such parent of parenthood be-
fore any court or in writing under oath; or (iii) by a previously concluded pro-
ceeding to determine parentage pursuant to the provisions of former 
§ 20-61.1 or Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of Title 20. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
160. Belton, 273 Va. at 373, 641 S.E.2d 76-77. 
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legitimate daughter.161 When Tracey sought the exhumation of 
Decedent's body for biological testing in furtherance of her claim, 
she was opposed by Wife who maintained that the exhumation 
statute should be read as requiring a showing of "good cause,"162 
which would require Tracey to show "'that DNA sufficient for a 
definitive paternity test could be retrieved in the specific circums-
tances here, e.g., embalming and the lapse of time since buri-
al."'163 In rejecting this claim, and affirming the trial court, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia traced the history of the exhumation 
legislation and noted that in the present statute "the General As-
sembly expressly provided that the need of a qualified illegitimate 
child to prove parentage for the purpose of inheritance is suffi-
cient cause for exhumation. No other cause need be shown."164 
I. Power of Attorney-Gift vs. Contract-Payable on Death 
Authority 
In Jones v. Brandt, Principal (''P') told Agent ("A") on August 4, 
2004 to make a friend ("F') the payable on death ("POD") benefi-
ciary on a certain $250,000 certificate of deposit.165 A, who was 
also P's lawyer, did so that same day and advised P thereof by let-
ter on the following day.166 The written power of attorney held by 
A did not expressly grant A the power to make a POD designa-
tion.167 Following P's death on September 30, 2004, F, as P's ex-
ecutor, brought suit to determine the validity of this transac-
tion.168 The Supreme Court of Virginia first decided that Virginia 
law relating to an agent's power "to make a gift" was not applica-
ble because the POD designation "did not become a final disposi-
tion of [P's] certificate until his death on September 30, 2004 and 
conveyed no present interest in the certificate, but only at best an 
expectancy."169 Instead, the court decided that the case concerned 
161. 273 Va. 722, 724, 643 S.E.2d 229, 230 (2007). 
162. Id. at 726, 643 S.E.2d at 231. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. On another point, the court held that "the word 'may' [in the exhumation sta-
tute] is jurisdictional and directional, rather than discretionary .... The court's only dis-
cretion is limited to determining whether the petitioner is a 'party attempting to prove' 
parentage for inheritance purposes in accordance with Code §§ 64.1-5.l and -5.2." Id. at 
727, 643 S.E.2d at 232. 
165. 274 Va. 131, 135, 645 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2007). 
166. Id. at 134, 135, 645 S.E.2d at 313, 314. 
167. Id. at 134, 645 S.E.2d at 313. 
168. Id. at 134, 135, 645 S.E.2d at 313, 314. 
169. Id. at 137, 645 S.E.2d at 315. 
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A's "power to contract on behalf of [.P]"l 70 and, although "[i]n Vir-
ginia, powers of attorney have been strictly construed for over a 
century,"171 the court, after considering three contract-related pa-
ragraphs of the power of attorney "in concert," concluded in a 
four-to-three decision that P "sufficiently expressed the intent to 
authorize [A]" to make the change in question.172 
The majority opinion's determination that the POD designation 
in F's favor was not a gift because it was not a "final disposition" 
during P's lifetime "and conveyed no present interest in the certif-
icate, but only at best an expectancy"l 73 appears to be based upon 
the fact that P had the power to revoke this designation until the 
moment of his death.174 However, looking at another body of law 
where this issue has long been settled, when Grantor creates a 
revocable inter vivos trust reserving a life estate and giving the 
remainder thereafter to Beneficiary, there is no doubt that Bene-
ficiary receives a present interest upon the trust's creation, not-
withstanding that it is not a "final disposition" until Grantor's 
death.175 And, drawing closer to a POD transaction, one of the 
required elements of the somewhat similar gift causa mortis is its 
revocability by the donor up to the moment of death.176 Thus, it is 
submitted that whether the POD designation in this case was a 
"gift" should have been determined by the presence of donative 
intent on P's part and the absence of any consideration flowing 
from F-not by the fact that the designation was revocable until 
P's death. A further troubling aspect of this decision relates to the 
precedent it establishes for the interpretation of other powers of 
attorney circulating in Virginia. It is believed that the typical 
170. Id. at 138, 645 S.E.2d at 315. 
171. Id. at 137, 645 S.E.2d at 315. 
172. Id. at 138, 645 S.E.2d at 315-16. In a footnote to its conclusion, the Supreme 
Court also noted: 
Although not addressed by the circuit court or raised by the parties in this 
appeal, we note that the doctrine of ratification would apply on the facts of 
this case even if the language of the power of attorney was not sufficiently 
specific to have permitted [A] to make the change in beneficiary on the certif-
icate. The record plainly shows that [P] orally directed [A] to act as his agent 
in the matter, and that [P], when advised by [A] that he had carried out that 
direction, accepted the fact of performance without objection. 
Id. at 139 n.2, 645 S.E.2d at 316 n.2 (citing Higginbotham v. May, 90 Va. 233, 238-39, 17 
S.E. 941, 943 (1893)). 
173. Jones, 274 Va. at 137, 645 S.E.2d at 315. 
174. See id. at 142, 645 S.E.2d at 318 (Russell, J., dissenting). 
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. b (2003). 
176. For a listing of the required elements for a gift causa mortis, see Woo u. Smart, 
247 Va. 365, 368-69, 442 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1994). 
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consumer would think that placing another's name on a bank ac-
count as a POD beneficiary would be a method for making a gift, 
and that the typical consumer executing a durable power of at-
torney does not wish the agent to be able to make gifts. However, 
the typical durable general power of attorney confers broad and 
comprehensive contracting powers upon the agent and it con-
cludes with an all-inclusive "do whatever I could do" authoriza-
tion. Do the agents under such documents have the power177 to 
make POD designations? And, what are the implications for 
transfer on death ("TOD") security registrations? Although these 
are issues that lawyers can address as they draft documents for 
future clients, what about existing documents-particularly those 
of incapacitated persons who are unable to change their powers? 
Absent legislation, it is difficult to see how this problem might be 
resolved. 
On another point, the majority opinion's statement of facts re-
cites that "[P] orally directed [A] to designate [.F] as the benefi-
ciary 'payable on death' (POD) of a certificate of deposit in the 
amount of $250,000, which was in [P's] name at the Pungo branch 
of Wachovia Bank."178 One wonders why this oral direction was 
not seen as a sufficient grant of authority for the transaction in 
question. According to section 3.01 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency, "[a]ctual authority, as defined in § 2.01179 is created by a 
principal's manifestation to an agent that, as reasonably unders-
tood by the agent, expresses the principal's assent that the agent 
take action on the principal's behalf."180 In amplification of this 
rule, the comments to the following section, section 3.02, state 
that in the absence of a statutory "equal-dignity" rule,181 
"[c]reating actual authority under § 3.01 does not require a writ-
ing or other formality."182 
177. The only question being posed here is whether an agent possesses such a power. 
The rightful exercise of the power is another issue. 
178. Jones, 274 Va. at 135, 645 S.E.2d at 314. 
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006), states that "[a]n agent acts with 
actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the 
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations 
to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act." 
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 3.01 (2006). 
181. VA. CODE ANN.§ 11-9.5 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2008), entitled "Gifts under 
power of attorney," deals with the contents of a "power of attorney or other writing," but it 
does not impose a writing requirement upon a principal's direction to an agent to make a 
particular transfer. 
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 3.02, cmt. b (2006). 
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J. Augmented Estate-Abandonment Defined-Voluntary 
Separation 
In Purce v. Patterson, Husband ("H') and Wife ("W') voluntari-
ly separated in June 2000; W filed an action for divorce in Janu-
ary 2003, based upon living separate and apart for over a year, 
but no divorce decree was ever entered; and H, following W's 
death in January 2005, claimed an elective share in W's aug-
mented estate.183 One of the statutes governing the augmented 
estate bars the survivor's right to an elective share if the survivor 
"willfully deserts or abandons his or her spouse and such deser-
tion or abandonment continues until the death of the spouse."184 
In passing upon H's claim, the Supreme Court of Virginia (1) de-
termined that "[i]n an elective share analysis, an agreed separa-
tion or petition for divorce ... is not evidence which defeats a 
finding of willful abandonment;"l85 (2) concluded that H's conduct 
following the couple's agreed-upon separation was relevant in de-
termining whether there was an abandonment that continued un-
til W's death;l86 (3) defined "abandonment" for elective share 
matters "to mean a termination of the normal indicia of a marital 
relationship combined with an intent to abandon the marital re-
lationship;"l87 and (4) held "that the evidence [was] sufficient to 
support the trial court's holding that [H] abandoned [Wj prior to 
and continuing until the time of her death."188 
Although Virginia lawyers may be pleased upon first hearing 
that they have been provided with a definition of "abandonment" 
for elective share purposes in cases where there has been a volun-
tary separation and one of the parties has filed for divorce, this 
pleasure is likely to be short-lived because it would appear that 
outcomes thereunder may very well vary "with the length of the 
chancellor's foot." Until the General Assembly or another Su-
preme Court of Virginia decision further defines "the normal indi-
cia of a marital relationship" and "intent to abandon the marital 
relationship" in cases where the parties thereto have voluntarily 
separated, it will not be possible for lawyers to advise affected 
clients regarding the appropriate course of action to take, due to 
183. 275 Va. 190, 192-93, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (2008). 
184. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
185. Purce, 275 Va. at 195, 654 S.E.2d at 887. 
186. Id. at 194, 654 S.E.2d at 887. 
187. Id. at 195, 654 S.E.2d at 887. 
188. Id. at 196, 654 S.E.2d at 888. 
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the varying interpretations that may be reached by circuit court 
judges. Fortunately, the problem will exist only in cases where 
the separated parties have not entered into an agreement that, 
among other things, addresses the elective share issue, and one 
would expect there to be such an agreement in the typical case. 
K. Wills-Execution-Witnesses' Signatures Only on Self-Proving 
Affidavit 
The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Hampton 
Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Stevens was "whether a 
will was subscribed by two witnesses as required by Code § 
64.1-49."189 The writing in question consisted of five pages, num-
bered one through five.190 The first three pages contained will 
provisions, with page three containing a testimonium clause (re-
ferring to "my Last Will and Testament, consisting of five pages"); 
Testatrix's signature; and spaces for witnesses to sign.191 Howev-
er, instead of the witnesses signing in these spaces, the notary 
printed their names therein, wrote their addresses next to their 
names, and then the witnesses placed their initials by their ad-
dresses.192 Page four of the writing contained a standard self-
proving affidavit, based upon the form found in Virginia Code 
section 64.1-87.1, with the signatures of Testatrix and the three 
witnesses appended thereto.193 Page five contained the certifica-
tion of the notary public to the self-proving affidavit.194 The court 
briefly noted "the rationale for the subscription requirement,"195 
noted "'[t]he literal meaning of the word subscribe, as used in the 
statute,"'196 and stated that, although the statutory requirements 
189. 275 Va. 205, 207, 657 S.E.2d 80, 81 (2008). The referenced code section is repro-
duced supra note 2. 
190. Stevens, 275 Va. at 207, 657 S.E.2d at 81. 
191. Id. at 207-08, 657 S.E.2d at 81. 
192. Id. at 208, 657 S.E.2d at 81. 
193. Id. at 208-09, 657 S.E.2d at 81-82; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol. 
2007). 
194. See Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83. 
195. Id. at 210-11, 657 S.E.2d at 83. The court quoted Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 
41-42, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1990), a case notable as one of the few instances where the 
Supreme Court of Virginia (in a four-to-three decision) applied "substantial compliance" 
instead of "strict adherence" to one of the statutory formalities. For a detailed discussion of 
Robinson, see J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing with Wills Act Formalities for Substantively 
Valid Wills, 18 VA. B. Ass'N J. 10 (1992). 
196. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting French v. Beville, 191 Va. 842, 
850, 62 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1951)). This literal meaning is "'to write underneath; sub, under; 
scribere, to write."' Id. (quoting French, 191 Va. at 850, 62 S.E.2d 886). 
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"must be strictly followed, the statute must not be construed in a 
manner that would 'increase the difficulty of the transaction to 
such an extent as to practically destroy' an uninformed layper-
son's right to dispose of property by will."197 Moving on to the 
facts, the court noted that Testatrix referred to her will as con-
sisting of five pages; she signed below this reference on page 
three; and she signed the self-proving affidavit on page four, 
"which, in this instance, is a part of her will .... [and two wit-
nesses] placed their signatures below the testatrix' signature on 
that page .... [which] satisfies the statutory requirement of sub-
scription contained in Code § 64.1-49."198 
There is no doubt that the correct result was reached in this 
case, but one wonders why the court did not simply hold that wit-
nesses' signing a self-proving affidavit to a will amounts to "sub-
stantial compliance" with the requirement for witnesses to sign 
the will to which it is appended,199 instead of holding that the 
self-proving affidavit was a part of the will200-which it really 
was not,201 a fact that is not changed by the testatrix's reference 
to her three-page will as consisting of five pages.202 Imagine, for 
instance, a future case otherwise identical to the present one, ex-
cept for the page numbering and "five-page" reference: how would 
it be resolved, based upon this precedent?203 On a more basic 
197. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 
546, 49 S.E. 668, 669-70 (1905)). However, the opinion in Savage was not focusing on the 
construction of the statute but on its judicial supplementation. The complete sentence from 
Savage reads as follows: 
It is, however, quite as important that these statutory requirements should 
not be supplemented by the courts with others that might tend to increase 
the difficulty of the transaction to such an extent as to practically destroy the 
right of the uninformed layman to dispose of his property by will. 
Savage, 103 Va. at 546, 49 S.E. at 669-70. 
198. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83. 
199. See the leading case of In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991). 
200. Stevens, 275 Va. at 211, 657 S.E.2d at 83 ("[T]he record is clear that the will con· 
sisted of five pages, including the self-proving affidavit on pages four and five."). 
201. The General Assembly recognized that these are separate documents in its 2007 
enactment of the statute permitting the trial court to dispense with a testator's signature 
to a will when "a person signs the self-proving certificate to a will instead of signing the 
will itself." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); discussion supra, Part II.A.; see 
also Ranney, 589 A.2d at 1341-44; 1973 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 473. 
202. One is reminded of the exercise where a goat is placed in a corner, with a sign 
around its neck saying, "I am a pig," and then the question being posed, "What's in the 
corner, a goat or a pig?" 
203. Fortunately, due to the enactment of a dispensation statute by the 2007 Session, 
the hypothetical will should be probated with no real problem, notwithstanding these dif-
ferences, because the trial court could dispense with the statutory requirement for the 
witnesses' signatures to be on the will. See supra Part II.A. However, it will require an 
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point, one also wonders why there was no discussion of the wit-
nesses' initials on page three of the will-which appeared in the 
margin opposite their printed names and addresses, below the 
testatrix's signature-as satisfying the statute's subscription re-
quirement.204 It is settled Virginia law that initials will suffice as 
a signature to a will,205 and that a person does not have to intend 
to be signing a will as a witness in order for the person's name 
placed thereon by the person to satisfy the witnessing require-
ment.206 Moreover, in the present case, the witnesses swore un-
der oath in the self-proving affidavit that they "did subscribe 
their names thereto [i.e., to the will] as attesting witnesses."207 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that 
the 2009 Session should (1) repeal the 2008 amendment expand-
ing the slayer statute's definition of "slayer" to include voluntary 
manslaughter;208 (2) clarify or replace the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's definition of "abandonment" in augmented estate cases 
where the parties have voluntarily separated;209 and (3) consider 
a legislative response to the question of whether contract lan-
guage in a power of attorney authorizes the agent thereunder to 
make a POD designation on the principal's bank account.210 
inter partes circuit court proceeding to obtain this remedy, whereas a holding in the in-
stant case that witnesses signing a self-proving affidavit was substantial compliance with 
the requirement for them to subscribe the will would allow the hypothetical will to be pro-
bated in the clerk's office, which would be much faster and less costly than an inter partes 
proceeding in circuit court. 
204. It might also be noted that the initials of the witnesses and the testatrix were 
placed in the margin of all five pages of the writing before the court. Transcript of Record 
at_, Hampton Roads Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Stevens, 275 Va. 205, 657 S.E.2d 
80 (No. 070401) (2008). 
205. See Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356, 366, 84 S.E. 667, 670 (1915). The entire holo-
graphic will of Edwin M. Pilcher read as follows: "'I give to my wife, Alice McCabe Pilcher, 
all of my property, real and personal. E.M.P."' Id. at 358, 84 S.E. at 668. 
206. See Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 44, 387 S.E.2d 735, 739 (1990). 
207. Stevens, 275 Va. at 208, 657 S.E.2d at 81-82. 
208. See supra Part III.A. 
209. See supra Part IV.J. 
210. See supra Part IV.I. 
